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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




Petitioner Ederjunio Coelho Gomes (“Petitioner”) has filed this petition for review 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (“petition”), challenging the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (“Board”) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings and dismissing 
his appeal from a decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”).  For the reasons stated below, 
we will deny the petition. 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
We write only for the attention of the parties and therefore limit our recitation of 
the facts to those necessary to decide this appeal.  Petitioner is a Brazilian citizen who 
illegally entered the United States in or around January 2001.  On October 30, 2013, 
Petitioner was convicted on a plea of guilty in the New Jersey Superior Court, Union 
County, of two counts: (1) possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to 
distribute under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5.2(a) and (2) possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property under 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7.  On both counts, the controlled dangerous substance was 
gamma hydroxybutyrate, commonly referred to as “GHB”.  Petitioner alleges he did not 
sell the GHB but rather exchanged it for cocaine, to which he was addicted at the time.  
The state court sentenced him to a five-year term of probation pursuant to New Jersey’s 
drug-court program. 
On January 29, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security instituted removal 
proceedings against Petitioner.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed an application for 
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asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”), averring that if he was removed to Brazil a Brazilian gang 
known as the PCC1 would harm him and his family.    
The IJ denied Petitioner’s application and ordered him removed.  Petitioner 
appealed to the Board but on December 19, 2019, it issued its decision adopting and 
affirming the IJ’s decision and denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen the case.  He then 
appealed to this Court.2   
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the Board adopts and affirms an IJ’s decision and there is a further appeal to 
this Court, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the Board.  See Shehu v. Att’y 
Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review the administrative factual findings 
using the substantial evidence standard under which the Board’s “findings must be 
upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  
Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).    Finally, we review the Board’s 
denial of motions to reopen removal proceedings for abuse of discretion.  INS v. Doherty, 
502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 725 (1992); Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153 
(3d Cir. 2007).  “Under the abuse of discretion standard, the Board’s decision must be 
 
1 PCC is an initialism for Primeiro Comando da Capital. 
 
2 On February 25, 2020, we denied Petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal.  (Coelho 
Gomes v. Att’y Gen., Docket No. 20-1085, ECF No. 13.) 
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reversed if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 153 (citation 
omitted).   
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The IJ found that Petitioner’s controlled substance offense constituted an 
aggravated felony that rendered Petitioner removable under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), a finding 
that Petitioner does not challenge on this appeal.3  When a petitioner is removable by 
virtue of a conviction for an aggravated felony, we review final orders of removal only 
for constitutional claims or questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); see also 
Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted) (“Because the basis for removal is [the petitioner’s] 
conviction for an aggravated felony, our jurisdiction is limited . . . to constitutional claims 
or questions of law.”); Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted).  Furthermore, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nasrallah v. 
Barr, when a noncitizen has committed crimes specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), 
we review factual challenges to an order denying CAT relief under the substantial 
evidence standard.  See 590 U.S. ___ (2020) (stating that under the substantial evidence 
 
3 In any event, such an assertion would lack merit.  Petitioner’s conviction under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5.2(a) constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) per the hypothetical felony route.  See e.g., Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 
F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Under the hypothetical federal felony route, we compare 
the offense of conviction to the federal Controlled Substances Act to determine if it is 




standard, “[t]he agency’s findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”).    
Petitioner does not demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on any of his theories.4  
In reviewing this matter we initially hold that the IJ correctly determined Petitioner was 
statutorily ineligible for asylum,5 and withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 
8 USC § 1231(b)(3) and CAT.  See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); 
INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  To rebut the particularly serious 
crime presumption, a petitioner in a controlled substance case must demonstrate all of the 
following six factors:  
(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very 
modest amount of money paid for the drugs in the offending 
transaction; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the alien in 
the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the 
absence of any violence or threat of violence, implicit or 
otherwise, associated with the offense; (5) the absence of any 
organized crime or terrorist organization involvement, direct 
or indirect, in relation to the offending activity; and (6) the 
absence of any adverse or harmful effect of the activity or 
transaction on juveniles. 
 
4 Although Petitioner mainly takes issue with the IJ’s factual findings, he attempt to 
present a constitutional challenge, alleging that the Board failed to review meaningfully 
the IJ’s opinion thereby denying him “due process under the relevant statutes, caselaw[,] 
and the Code of Federal Regulations.”  (Pet. Br. at 44.)  Petitioner’s facile argument lacks 
persuasion in light of our prior determination that a Board’s decision is entitled to 
deference when it expresses approval of the decision under review by citing to Matter of 
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994).  See Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240, 
243, n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 980 (6th Cir. 2005)) 
(“[C]itation of Burbano . . . does not mean that the [Board] did not exercise its 
independent review authority over the case, but rather . . . [the Board] adopts or affirms 
the [IJ’s] decision when it is ‘in agreement with the reasoning and result of that 
decision.’”) (citation omitted). 
 




In re Y-L, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 276-77 (BIA 2002).   
Petitioner cannot reasonably contend he had mere peripheral involvement in the 
drug exchange that led to his conviction.  In fact, Petitioner’s only argument attempting 
to refute a conclusion that he had more than peripheral involvement is that “[a]lthough 
there was arguably more than ‘peripheral’ involvement in the offense by Petitioner, there 
was no ‘transaction or conspiracy’ involved.’”  (Pet. Br. at 38.)  But Petitioner does not 
explain why the drug exchange did not constitute a “transaction,” and he ignores the fact 
that exchanging GHB for cocaine clearly constitutes criminal activity.  Thus, the IJ 
correctly determined Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that his conviction 
under N.J. Stat. Ann.  § 2C:35-5.2(a) constituted a particularly serious crime. 
The IJ also correctly held that Petitioner was ineligible for deferral of removal 
under CAT.  See Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.17) (“Section 1208.17(a) establishes that aliens meeting the burden of 
proof for CAT relief, but ineligible for withholding of removal . . . shall instead be 
granted deferral of removal.”).  To qualify for deferral of removal under CAT, a 
petitioner must prove “it is more likely than not that he [or she] will be subject to torture 
by, at the instigation of, or with the acquiescence of a public official.” Amanfi v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 725 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 208.18(a)); see 
also Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at ___ n.1.  When evaluating whether a petitioner is more likely 
than not to be tortured in the country to which removal is proposed, courts must consider 
the following non-exclusive list of factors: 
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(1) evidence of past torture inflicted on the alien; (2) the 
possibility the alien could relocate to another part of the 
country where his [or her] torture is unlikely; (3) evidence of 
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the 
country; and (4) any other relevant country conditions 
information. 
 
Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)). 
Petitioner failed to demonstrate he was likely to be tortured if he returned to 
Brazil.  In this regard, the IJ reasonably determined Petitioner’s claims relied on a single 
instance that occurred around 2001, and neither Petitioner nor his family has been 
threatened or injured since that time.  The record also supports the IJ’s conclusion that 
Brazilian law enforcement agents actively combat the PCC’s presence in the country, 
thereby undermining Petitioner’s assertion that Brazil would acquiesce in his torture.  
Therefore, because we are not persuaded that a reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude contrary to the IJ or Board, Petitioner’s challenges to the CAT 
order fail.    
Finally, Petitioner fails to support his contention that the Board erred in denying 
his motion to reopen that he predicated on his contention that prior counsel in the 
removal proceedings provided him ineffective assistance.  (See e.g., Pet. Br. at 30 
(“[T]his Court should remand this matter . . . to allow Petitioner to fully and completely 
present all applications and claims . . . , something he was denied an opportunity to do by 
prior counsel . . . .”).)  Petitioner, however, fails to provide any facts—or even 
argument—to show he would have been entitled to relief had his prior counsel not erred 
in the presentation of his case.  See, e.g., Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 584 (3d 
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Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (explaining that to establish an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show “there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result of the removal proceedings would have been different had the 
error(s) not occurred”).   Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen. 
In view of our conclusions on all of Petitioner’s claims, we will deny his petition 
for review.  
